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Back in 2018, a mere a short phrase to energize a Labour conference demonstrating Labour was falling out of love with Jeremy Corbyn. Although not exactly soaring oratory, the phrase were greeted with wild cheering as delegates stood for an impromptu ovation.

As the commotion died down, Keir Starmer, remained at the lectern, visibly startled. He wasn't really accustomed to his speeches producing such a reaction. All he had said was: "We are not excluding staying in the EU". But context is everything.

In that darkly divisive time of 2018, straying from his agreed text like this was always going to be seen as issuing a challenge to the party leader, who was trying to prioritise Brexit voters in working-class seats above the Europhile sentiments of his party. In just one speech, this seemingly cautious shadow Brexit secretary was transformed – if only for a while – into a political gambler who championed the party's base against a leader he would later replace.

The Evolution in Position & Closed Debates

Since then, the landscape has shifted, not least to Starmer himself. One of his first acts after taking over from Corbyn in 2020 was declaring the EU question was resolved by the 2019 general election. During the most recent campaign, he consistently stressed manifesto “red line” promises that ruled out rejoining the EU, the single market or a customs union.

Similar to Corbyn, the PM's approach has been to pursue Brexit-y voters in target constituencies, even if polling evidence indicates many of them have passed away or shifted opinion.

Pressure Building on the EU

Yet, it’s now Starmer is now to be an embattled Labour leader. While EU relations is no longer the boiling pot of British politics, the cap that has been kept firmly shut since Brexit is beginning to rattle once more.

Both Starmer and Rachel Reeves have ramped up the rhetoric about the devastation that leaving the EU has inflicted on the UK’s economy. This serves as an effective tool with which to beat Nigel Farage, who now rarely mentions how leaving the EU was once his singular purpose and is still his sole political accomplishment.

And yet, the extent of the economic harm, which by some estimates has resulted in a national economy that is between 6% and 8% smaller than if it were still in the EU, dwarfs the minor adjustments so far offered by ministers. Starmer’s so-called relationship reset agreed with Brussels in 2024 offers economic benefits measured in fractions of a percent.

Internal Pressure and Ambitious Proposals

The chancellor is one of those attempting to bypass entrenched Home Office resistance to a broader scheme designed to boost growth youth mobility scheme by which young people can travel between the UK and the EU to study or work.

David Lammy has pondered publicly about the “self-evident” benefits of being in an EU customs pact, while a dozen Labour MPs, such as the head of the Treasury select committee, recently voted for an opposition proposal on joining one.

Although Nick Thomas-Symonds, who oversees UK-EU relations, now present at every cabinet meeting, insists the firm boundaries are still in place, there exist avenues these could be bypassed. One idea involves declaring the commencement of talks immediately for a more ambitious agreement, to be featured in the following election platform, with implementation only if securing a new electoral mandate.

Starmer's Fundamental Doubts

Yet, Starmer has lately been damping it all down again by warning a return to a European customs area could undermine the trade pacts with the US, which he views as signature achievements of his premiership.

Reportedly that the PM’s scepticism go still deeper, and is rooted in several key concerns.

1. Firstly, he thinks any customs union agreement has been made significantly more difficult as ministers are busily de-aligning from European rules across a range of sectors, like environmental standards.
2. Second, the exorbitant price demanded from Britain for entry into the EU’s new defence fund and the ensuing failure of negotiations has led UK negotiators that European nations are less interested in offering favorable terms to the UK than in proving that Brexit does not work.
3. Lastly, the new US national security strategy, which has been welcomed by the Kremlin, is viewed by key advisors in Downing Street as a reason for Britain to maintain distance from the EU.

An Alarming Document and Strategic Calculations

This bizarre and terrifying American strategy paper asserts Europe is threatened by “civilizational erasure” because of Muslim migration. It contains only one reference of the UK, found on a suggestion that the US government will intervene in British politics to encourage the rise of “patriotic” parties.

However, instead of deciding that this makes the US an unreliable partner, the government reportedly fear that deeper EU integration would destabilise geopolitics further by risking precarious American backing for Kyiv, NATO, and other alliances.

Succession Chatter & The Ghost of 2018

All of which returns us to 2018. The PM has consistently stated his speech was not a pitch to become leader but merely an effort to preserve the possibility of remain in a future vote. In fact, in those days, Starmer still favoured a “bespoke customs union deal” of the kind he currently seems to reject.

Observers within the Prime Minister's office note that the Health Secretary, widely considered would be a candidate in any leadership election, is part of a clutch of cabinet ministers signaling they want to go further on Europe.

Staff for the Deputy Prime Minister, another likely contender in a future race for the top job, maintain she won’t discuss her stance regarding a customs pact as it would merely “escalate unhelpful speculation”.

The Obvious Risk and A Prudent Memory

The danger is obvious. Should the PM reject significant moves towards a close relationship, he allows rivals to claim the territory where the overwhelming majority of the party's supporters reside.

It would be wise for Starmer to recall the effect that a short phrase had for him seven years ago. Potential pathways for a big offer on EU relations that the prime minister should not “rule out”; he should prise them open himself, before someone else makes them his – or her – own.